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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,

Case No. 980343-CA

vs.
EDWARD PECK,

:

Defendant/Appellant.

Priority No. 2

:

BRIEF OF APPELLANT PECK
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction in this matter
pursuant to Utah Code Ann.,

§ 78-2a-3(2)(e).

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
1.

Was the complainant's testimony of having received

calls, the purpose of which she does not know, and which she
did not take time to determine sufficient to establish a prima
facie case when the protective order provided for contact as
it related to the subject of the mutual children of the
parties?
2. May the conviction stand when the Court's findings are
not supported by the record?

3.

Where

an alternative

hypothesis

consistent

with

innocence is not precluded by the evidence, may the Court
convict?
DETERMINATIVE LAW
The determinative law in this case includes Utah
Ann.,

§ 76-5-108 which

charges are filed.

is the

statute under which

The case of State

of

Utah v.

Code
these

Layman,

953

P.2d 782 (Utah Ct. App. 1998)sets forth the requirements for
evidence necessary to support a conviction and the need for
the

evidence

to

preclude

all

reasonable

hypothesis

of

innocence.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Charges relating to violations of Protective Orders were
filed on three different occasions against Mr, Peck during the
spring of 1997. After a substantial period of time, all three
of

the

warrants

were

consolidated for trial.

finally

served

and

the

matter

On March 9, 1998, all three cases

were tried before the Honorable Anthony B. Quinn, in the West
Valley Department of the Third Judicial District Court.

One

of the cases involved charges of protective order violation
and telephone harassment; the other two cases each involved
only protective order violations.
2

Following a trial to the

bench,

at

which

only

the

complainant

and

the

defendant

testified, the Court found Mr. Peck not guilty of the first
Information which contained the two charges, but guilty of the
remaining two protective order violations.
appeal to this Court.

Mr. Peck filed an

Because of delays in the signing of the

court judgment, proceedings were had before this Court before
the appeal was finally allowed.

By prior order of this Court,

the appeal is perfected.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Defendant Edward Peck, and the complainant, Amanda Eaby,
had a relationship that produced twin babies. The relationship
terminated, but friction between the parties survived the end
of the relationship.

(Transcript at p.5.)

On December 30, 1996, Complainant obtained a protective
order against Mr. Peck.

As a part of the protective order,

she received temporary custody of the minor children of the
parties.

(Protective order paragraph 11.)

challenged custody in a separate proceeding.

Mr. Peck, however,
In executing the

Protective Order, Judge Wilkinson further qualified the normal
terms providing that the no-contact provision be amended with
the

exception

of

"except

as

(Protective Order.)
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it

relates

to

visitation".

The instant case arises out of allegations made by the
complainant that Mr. Peck violated the contact restrictions
provision

of

occasions.

that

protective

order

on

three

different

As a result of the allegations of the complainant,

three Informations were issued from West Valley City.
three

Informations

consisting

of

four

charges

These
were

consolidated for trial on March 9, 1998 before Judge Anthony
Quinn.
The first Information

(971001390) alleged one count of

violation of a protective order, and one count of telephone
harassment, both occurring on February 2, 1997.

From the

computer dating, it appears that the charging document was
prepared on March 26, 1997.
Complainant claimed that she received a call while she
was asleep on this date.

That the phone rang a number of

times, the number she was not certain, but by the time she got
to it there was no-one there.

She dialed *69 and it revealed

that the call had come from the defendant's home telephone
number.

(Transcript at p.7.)

after midnight.

She set the time of the call

Defendant was found not guilty of these two

charges.
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The second Information (971001871) alleged one count of
violation of a protective order occurring on February 2, 1997.
This charging document was prepared on April 23, *1997.
The complainant testified that on this date she had
received a call at about 11:00 p.m., that when she answered
the phone that it was Mr. Peck and he asked if they could
talk.

She declined to talk to him.

He asked again if they

could talk and she hung up the phone. She stated that later
she found a funeral notice of a mutual acquaintance in her
car.

(Transcript at pp 9-11.)

The Court found Mr. Peck

guilty of this charge.
The third Information (971002372) alleged one count of
violation of a protective order occurring on March 24, 1997.
This charging document was prepared on May 19, 1997.
The complainant testified that on this occasion she
answered the phone, heard Mr. Peck's voice speak her name and
immediately hung up.

(Transcript at p. 12.)

The Court found

Mr. Peck guilty of this charge.
Some time after all of these claimed events, Mr. Peck was
served with the Informations, entered pleas of not guilty, and
eventually had the matters heard in a bench trial.

The only

witnesses at trial were the complainant and the defendant.
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Following the testimony of the complainant the defense moved
to dismiss.

The Court denied the motion.

At the conclusion

of the evidence, the Court found Mr. Peck not guilty on the
charges found in the first Information and guilty of the two
charges in the second and third Informations,
Defendant appealed the convictions.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Where protective order violations are founded

in the

clause of the protective order prohibiting contact between the
parties;

and where

that

contact

has not been

completely

prohibited but allowed under some circumstances; and where the
nature of the contact was such that even by the allegations of
the complainant, no purpose for the communications could be
determined before communications were terminated, the State
has failed to establish a prima

facie

case and the charges

against the defendant should have been dismissed when the City
rested.
The Court did not dismiss the charges on motion of the
defendant at

the close of the prosecution's case and the

defendant then testified that he had not made the telephone
calls in question.

No additional information was provided

which added any support to the State's case.

6

Thus, there was

insufficient evidence to ultimately support a conviction.
The matter was further aggravated when the Court, at the
close of the evidence, made its findings of fact; and in so
doing, made reference to matters of evidence which in fact had
not

occurred

evidence.

and

accordingly

were

not

supported

by

the

Thus, the finding of the Court is called into

question.
ARGUMENT
I.
THE
COURT
SHOULD
HAVE
GRANTED
THE
DEFENDANT'S
MOTION
TO
DISMISS
THE
INFORMATIONS
AT
THE
CLOSE
OF
THE
PROSECUTION'S
CASE WHEN
THE EVIDENCE
PRESENTED GAVE NO HINT OF THE INTENT OF THE
CALLER AND WHERE CONTACT HAD NOT BEEN
TOTALLY PROHIBITED BY THE PROTECTIVE ORDER.
While a defendant need never present any evidence at
trial, and even in the face of no evidence presented, the
trier of fact must still determine if the evidence presented
establishes every element of the offense beyond a reasonable
doubt, a defendant is still entitled to a dismissal at the
close of the prosecution case if the prosecution has failed to
make a prima facie case as to each element of the offense
charged.

U.R.C.P.

18 (o).
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At the conclusion of the bench trial, the Court found Mr.
Peck guilty on two of the three counts of violation of a
protective order, Utah
misdemeanors.

Code Ann.,

§ 76-5-108, both class A

The elements of this offense require proof that

1) the defendant was subject to a protective order; 2) that he
engaged in conduct that violated the terms of that order; and
3) that he intentionally violated the terms of the order, i.e.
that he acted with specific intent.
In this case there was never any question respecting the
first element.

The complainant had obtained a protective

order on December 30, 1996.
all

that

the

complainant

But this order had not provided
wanted.

The

Judge

in his

own

handwriting had modified the form of the order to provide that
the no

contact provision

of the order would

still

allow

contact respecting visitation of the parties mutual children.
(Trial Transcript Page 14, line 10 through Page 15 line 10.)
This modification to the language of the order meant that
the mere act of communication itself under this order was not
a violation of the order.

Such contact can only become a

violation when done with improper purpose.

Thus, under this

order both the second and third elements of the offense would
need proof of something beyond a mere contact before the

8

burden of the prosecution can be met.
Before the second element can be found, there must be a
showing

that

the

call

was

for

a

purpose

outside

the

restrictions of the order, and before the third element can be
found it must be shown that such an improper purpose was the
intent of the defendant-

No evidence as to either of these

critical elements of the charge is found in the evidence
presented.
Nevertheless, the Court

denied

defendant's motion to

dismiss at the close of the City's case.

In denying the

motion to dismiss, the Court created a presumption not found
in law.

He ruled "I think calls that take place at 1:00 in

the morning are ipso facto, not made

for the purpose of

conducting normal business/' (Transcript, page 25 line 3-6.)
Even if there was such an assumption, it would not apply to
the call claimed to have been made on February 20th.

By the

testimony of the complainant, that call was made at about
11:00 p.m. (Transcript, page 9, lines 15-19.)

So this call

was not within the Court's presumption, the Court, however,
denies

the motion

as to

this

discussion of visitation.
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Court

because

there

is no

The testimony of the complainant on this issue is that
the phone rang, she answered it, that she heard the defendant,
that he said: "Can we talk?" To this non specific question she
answered: "No, we cannot/'

He answered: "We can't talk?"

Or

again repeated himself, and on that note the conversation
ended.

(Transcript page 18, lines 10-22.)

She admits clearly

that Mr. Peck never indicated "in any fashion whatsoever what
it was he wanted to talk . . . about". (Id at lines 23-24.)
Here, the Court places the burden on the defendant to
announce quickly, within two comments the purpose of the call
or be guilty of a class A misdemeanor.
In State of

Utah v.

Layman,

953 P.2d 782 (Utah. Ct. App.

1998) the Court sets the requirements for evidence sufficient
to convict a criminal offense at a higher level.

Finding the

evidence in that case to be "inconclusive" the Court cautions:
"Most

importantly,

however,

neither

possibilities

nor

probabilities can substitute for certainty beyond a reasonable
doubt."

The Court then goes on to quote State

v. Murphy,

P. 2d 399 (Utah 1980):
Criminal convictions may not
conjectures or probabilities
can uphold a conviction
supported
by
a
quantum
concerning each element of
charged from which the jury
10

be based upon
and before we
it must be
of
evidence
the crime as
may base its

617

conclusion of guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt•
State

v.

Murphy

at 4 02,

While a lower standard of proof exists for a motion at
the close of the prosecution's case, it would be improper to
create presumptions to support the denial of such a motion if
they would not be valid presumptions for use in the final
determination of the evidence.

The prosecution failed to

establish a prima facie case and the defense motion should
have been granted as to both of the counts of conviction.
II.
THE FINDINGS OF THE COURT ARE NOT SUPPORTED
BY THE EVIDENCE.
Bench trials are reviewed under a different standard than
are jury trials.

When reviewing a bench trial, the Court

looks to see if the court's judgement was x>against the clear
weight of the evidence or if the appellate court otherwise
reaches a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been
made. State
The

v. Reed, 839 P. 2d. 878, 879 (Utah Ct. App. 1992).
conviction

entered

by

the

trial

court will be

reversed if the reviewing court finds that "the factual
findings made by the trial court are not adequately supported
by the record, resolving all disputes in the evidence in a
11

light most favorable to the trial court's determination/'
Jouflas

v.

Fox Television

1996); State v. Pena,

Stations,

927 P.2d 170, 174 (Utah

869 P.2d 932, 935-36 (Utah 1994).

The Court found that Mr. Peck was vague in his testimony
about making calls:
Mr. Peck, with respect to other questions
during this time, when asked if he'd made
the calls, his testimony was a combination
of absolute denial in at least one case,
but juxtaposed against a statement of "I
don't recall making such calls" with
respect to other questions.
And that
struck me as undercutting his credibility.
If the calls actually had not happened, I
would expect an absolute denial with
respect to each question that was asked.
There was no denial whatsoever with respect
to delivery of Exhibit 1. I don't believe
he was ever asked that question.
Transcript, page 41 line 24 to page 42 line 9.
The Courts memory of the testimony is not supported by
the record.

The only comments respecting "memory" come in

connection with Mr. Peck's testimony that on a single occasion
he punched a button on his speed dial that resulted in a call
being initiated to the complainants number, but that he
immediately hung up the phone.
A.
Q.
A.

"I remember one call, which was by accident.
"What happened on that call?
I hung up.
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Transcript, page 27, lines 23-25.
Thereafter, Mr. Peck

is absolutely

adamant

in each

question asked that he never called the complainant.

The

Court's perception that he answered some questions with a lack
of memory regarding having called is clearly wrong.
Q.
A.
Q.
A.
Q.

A.
Q.

A.
Q.
A.

You heard her testify about your
calling and telling her that you
wanted to talk to her.
Yes, I did.
Did that take place?
No, it didn't.
And you've heard her testify on
another occasion that - - in March
that you called her and she hung up
when she heard your name. Dit that
happen?
No.
Now, subsequent to all of this, have
you had some times when you've talked
to her, communicated with her with
respect to the subject of visitation?
I haven't.
Or any other subject?
No.

Transcript page 28 lines 7-21.
Q.

A.

Other than this one call that you
mentioned, where you punched the
redial by — or the auto dial by
accident on your phone, did you ever
call her at 1:00 in the middle of the
night?
No, I didn't.

Transcript page 29 lines 5-9.
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There

is

no

equivocations

specific and clear.
calls.

It

would

in

the

testimony

it

was

Mr. Peck absolutely denied making those
appear

that

the

Court

misheard,

misunderstood, or confused Mr. Peck's testimony with some
other case.

What is important is that his finding reveals

that he was confused by the evidence and that his verdict is
not properly founded in the evidence of the case.
Further, it was improper for the Court to infer from the
lack of testimony regarding Exhibit 1 by Mr. Peck, what his
answer might have been had he been asked.

This is not a

situation where he was asked the question and stated he had no
recollection.
sides

have

questions.

He was never asked about that document.

the

opportunity

to

evidence

and

ask

It is not the proper role of a witness, not even

allowed, to volunteer evidence.
(1950).

present

Both

State

v.

Lack,

221 P.2D 852

There was no evidence that linked Mr. Peck in any

fashion to the funeral notice, and the Court was improper to
infer from the lack of testimony that Mr. Peck was the one
that put it in the complainant's car.

The Court mistakes the

evidence presented, then formulates findings that are not
supported by the evidence.

The findings of the trial court

are not supported and should be reversed.
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III.
THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED DOES NOT PRECLUDE
REASONABLE HYPOTHESIS OF INNOCENCE AND
REQUIRED THE TRIAL COURT TO ACQUIT.
In this case, there is no evidence supporting the element
of intent, or the purpose component of the element of the call
being placed.

In reaching his verdict, the trial court infers

from the circumstances surrounding the calls that they were
for an improper purpose, and with an improper intent.

But

such circumstantial evidence is insufficient to eliminate all
reasonable hypothesis of innocence.
The

requirement

that

all

reasonable

hypothesis

of

innocence must be precluded is clearly embodied in the law of
this state:
However, 'where the only evidence presented
against the defendant circumstantial, the
evidence supporting a conviction must
preclude every reasonable hypothesis of
innocence. This is because the existence
of a reasonable hypothesis of innocence
necessarily raises a reasonable doubt as to
the defendant's guilt.' State
v. Hill,
727
P.2d.
221,222
(Utah
1986) (plurality
opinion)(citing State
v. Romero,
554 P.2d
216, 219 (Utah 1976).

State

v. Layman,

Supra at 786.

There clearly exists in this case a reasonable hypothesis
of innocence.

That is that these two calls, even if they did
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take place were not being placed for a purpose prohibited by
the protective order.

So long as this potential exists and

has not been overcome by a scintilla of evidence

to the

contrary, the trial court was required to acquit.
In the February 20th call, there is a short exchange
between the parties, but the defendant only makes two comment,
both of them the same: "Can we talk?"

He does not state what

he wants to talk about and she never asks.
respond:

She doesn't

"Only if its about the children." Or any other

qualification, she just says "NO" and the call ends.

It is

impossible to infer from this brief exchange what the purpose
of the call was meant to be.
In the March call, the complainant testified that as soon
as she hears the voice of Mr. Peck speak her name she hangs
up.

Again, except for the claim that it happened late at

night, there is no support for an improper purpose to the
call.
CONCLUSION
There is insufficient evidence to support the conviction
of the defendant in this case.

The only manner in which these

convictions can be sustained is through the use of conjecture
and the creation of presumptions that cannot properly rule out
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innocent motive and intent.

The findings of the trial judge

are against the clear weight of the evidence and should be
reversed.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

/Z^- day of January, 1999.

JEROME H. ^OONEY
LARSEN__&J40ON^Y LAW

50 West Broadway, First Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: (801) 364-6500
Attorneys for Appellant
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the /k-^
day of January, 1999, a
copy of the foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLANT PECK was mailed to:
J. Richard Catten, Esq.
West Valley City Attorney's Office
3600 Constitution Blvd.
West Valley City, Utah 84119
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Defendant to Commence Serving Jail Sentence
(2) RESTITUTIONS
Pay to:
Court
Victim
Show Proof to Court
(3) COURT COSTS $__
(4) ATTORNEY FEES $
TOTAL DUES /gft "
monthly/lst Pmt Due
Last Pmt Due
*5-tf-*(8
Payment Schedule: Pay $_
(5) Community Service
(6) Probation
Court
AP&P
ACEC
Other
(7) TERMS OF PROBATION:
• Counseling thru
Q No Further Violations
~
/month Q Classes
Q AA Meetings
Avk _
Q
In/Out
Treatment,
• Follow Program
Q Health Testing
• No Alcohol
• Employment- -•" ~y'**>
Q Antabuse
Proof Of
(8) Plea in Abeyance/Diversion
v
, x "U
c
(9) Review
/
/ at

«£

APPEAL MUST BE FILED WITHIN
30 DAYS OF JUDGMENT
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